The moment that stayed with me from PrepCom II wasn’t a breakthrough, but a challenge. When the special circumstances of SIDS were questioned on the floor, the room tightened. For delegations representing small islands, this wasn’t just a matter of phrasing, it was about recognition. Without that framing, access to funding, capacity, and even standing in negotiations could be weakened. That exchange revealed what much of the PrepCom was really about: whose priorities would shape the new institutions.
On paper, the agenda was procedural: rules of procedure, the Clearing-House Mechanism (ClHM), and finance. In practice, these discussions carried profound equity stakes. For SIDS, clarity on finance and recognition of their circumstances are not abstract principles; they are the difference between participating fully and effectively across the treaty’s institutions, or being left on the margins of the very system designed to serve them.
Why this moment matters
On 19 September 2025, the 60th state instrument of ratification for the Agreement on Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) was deposited, triggering entry into force (EIF) on 17 January 2026. This marks the start of the first binding global framework to conserve and sustainably use biodiversity in the two-thirds of the ocean beyond national jurisdiction.
But “sixty” is just a beginning. Effectiveness will depend on whether early decisions include those with the most at stake, and whether implementation can move on day one. PrepCom II made progress, but it also exposed how fragile inclusivity remains.
What PrepCom II revealed
Negotiations in New York from 18 to 29 August 2025 were organised into three clusters: governance, the ClHM, and finance. Six topics advanced into text-based negotiations, up from three after PrepCom I. Yet beneath that procedural achievement, the debates highlighted deeper tensions about power, access, and equity.
The Rules of Procedure were read in full, but discussions on virtual participation and emergency measures became a test of inclusivity. For many small delegations, remote access is not a convenience but a lifeline, and the final wording will determine whether they can contribute meaningfully or remain on the margins. Equity concerns were broadly shared, but perspectives diverged. Some delegations emphasised that virtual access enhances participation and continuity, while others pointed to persistent connectivity barriers and platform restrictions that can in practice exclude them from deliberations.
The draft Terms of Reference for the Scientific and Technical Body (STB) sparked divisions over independence versus COP control. Some delegations pressed for the body to serve as a genuinely independent source of advice, while others preferred tighter oversight. For SIDS, the balance will shape whether the STB becomes a reliable, depoliticised source of science or simply another contested forum.
The question of the Secretariat’s location carried similar undertones. Belgium and Chile are preparing bids, and while cost and logistics are practical concerns, the equity stakes are clear: will the Secretariat be situated in a place accessible to those who need it most, or in yet another hub that privileges already well-resourced delegations?
Co-operation with other instruments and frameworks received broad support in principle, with references to existing models such as OSPAR–NEAFC collaboration and ISA’s DeepData. But here, too, the question was not just technical. Smaller delegations voiced concern that data flows and enforcement arrangements could once again be dominated by those with the capacity to use them.
Reporting attracted less attention, but the underlying risk was obvious. Unless carefully designed, a heavy reporting burden could overwhelm the very states that most need to benefit from the treaty.
The ClHM and finance fault lines
If one issue crystallised the tension at PrepCom II, it was the Clearing-House Mechanism. Delegations could not finalise the terms of reference for the technical group. SIDS representation and an objection procedure for nominees were the main sticking points. The side-room atmosphere was tense, and the scheduling of these meetings against main sessions only heightened pressure. A pragmatic hedge may be to launch an interim “Phase-1” ClHM at EIF, with basic upload/download functions, notifications, identifiers, and a help desk. This would prevent a governance cold start, while fuller features continue to be negotiated.
Finance was no less fraught. Article 52 promises adequate, accessible, new and additional, predictable resources, but PrepCom II revealed how difficult it will be to turn those words into practice.
The updated GEF MoU drew sensitivity over the balance between BBNJ authority and GEF Council prerogatives. No consensus emerged on sending guidance into the GEF-9 replenishment cycle, though intersessional options remain.
Discussions of the Special Fund and Voluntary Trust Fund carried a pragmatic tone but were constrained. An interim participation fund is expected to bridge delegations to COP1, while debates continue on the design of a formal Voluntary Trust Fund. For the Special Fund, direct access for developing states and for Indigenous Peoples and local communities remains unresolved, along with the role of the GEF.
Work on COP financial rules showed urgency, with movement on a finance committee, a working capital reserve, and the UN scale of assessments. Yet arrears provisions drew pushback, underlining the political sensitivity of financial commitments.
What stood out to me in these finance discussions was how often the debate circled back to access: who can tap into these funds, on what terms, and how quickly. Without clear answers, the risk is that the treaty builds an elegant financial architecture that delivers too little, too late.
Looking ahead
Before COP1, governments will strive to publish zero-drafts on the Rules of Procedure, co-operation modalities, and financial rules; provide a functional interim ClHM; and keep late ratifiers moving so they arrive at COP1 as Parties with a vote.
Between EIF and PrepCom III in March–April 2026, texts for the RoP and STB should be developed, draft decisions tabled on co-operation and the Special Fund, and a refreshed GEF MoU provided for further consideration. The Secretariat bids from Belgium and Chile will also need to be assessed against access and cost criteria.
By COP1, expected in late 2026, Parties must adopt an initial package: the RoP, subsidiary body ToRs, ClHM decision, co-operation modalities, and financial rules with resourced funds. That package should also contain early-action envelopes for ABMTs, capacity-building, and ClHM scale-up.
A closing reflection
PrepCom II showed progress, but it also revealed how fragile inclusivity remains. The questioning of SIDS’ special circumstances crystallised the stakes. If the first global framework for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction begins without equity embedded in its core institutions, it risks building legitimacy on shaky ground. Recognising those circumstances in finance, participation, and governance is not an optional add-on. It is the condition for making the treaty work for everyone.